(8) The Czechoslovak Government shall release, within four weeks of the date of this Agreement, from its military and police forces all Sudeten Germans who wish to be released, and the Czechoslovak Government shall release, within the same period, Sudeten German prisoners serving prison sentences for political offences. 7. There is an option to enter and leave the transferred territories which shall be exercised within six months from the date of this Agreement. A German-Czechoslovak commission determines the details of the option, examines ways to facilitate the transfer of population and clarifies the fundamental issues arising from the transfer. GERMANY, the United Kingdom, France and Italy, taking into account the agreement in principle already concluded on the allocation of the German territory of the Sudetenland to Germany, have agreed on the following conditions for the transfer and the resulting measures, and by this agreement they each hold themselves responsible for the measures necessary to ensure their implementation: On 22 September, Chamberlain flew back to Germany and met Hitler in Bad Godesberg, where he was dismayed to learn that Hitler had tightened his demands: he now wanted the Sudetenland to be occupied by the German army and the Czechoslovaks to be evacuated from the area by September 28. Chamberlain agreed to present the new proposal to the Czechoslovaks, who rejected it, as did the British cabinet and the French. On the 24th. the French ordered a partial mobilization; the Czechoslovaks had ordered a general mobilization the day before. Czechoslovakia, which at the time was one of the best-equipped armies in the world, was able to mobilize 47 divisions, 37 of which were destined for the German border, and the mainly mountainous line of this border was heavily fortified.
On the German side, the final version of “Case Green”, approved by Hitler on May 30, showed 39 divisions for operations against Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovaks were ready to fight, but could not win alone. After successfully accepting Austria into Germany proper in March 1938, Adolf Hitler looked nostalgically at Czechoslovakia, where about three million people in the Sudetenland were of German descent. In April, he discussed with Wilhelm Keitel, the head of the Bundeswehr`s high command, the political and military aspects of “Case Green,” the code name for the planned Sudeten takeover. A surprise attack on “clear skies without reason or justification” was rejected because the result would have been “hostile world opinion that could lead to a critical situation.” Decisive action would therefore take place only after a period of German political turmoil in Czechoslovakia, accompanied by diplomatic quarrels which, as they became more serious, would either constitute an excuse for the war itself or give rise to a lightning offensive after an “incident” of German creation. In addition, disruptive political activities in Czechoslovakia had been underway since October 1933, when Konrad Henlein founded the Sudeten German Home Front. The area marked September 1 and 2. October No. I; the area marked with number II on 2 and 3 October; the area marked with number III on 3, 4 and 5 October; the zone marked n° IV on 6 and 7 October. The remaining territory of a predominantly German character will be immediately identified by the above-mentioned international commission and occupied by German troops by 10 October.
At the last minute, to avoid war, Chamberlain proposed to immediately convene a four-power conference to settle the dispute. Hitler agreed, and on September 29, Hitler, Chamberlain, Daladier, and Italian dictator Benito Mussolini met in Munich. The meeting in Munich began shortly before 1 p.m.m. Hitler could not hide his anger that instead of entering the head of his army on the day he himself had set as liberator at the head of his army, he had to adhere to the mediation of the three powers, and none of his interlocutors dared to insist that the two Czech diplomats waiting in a Hotel in Munich, should be admitted to the conference room or consulted on the agenda. Nevertheless, Mussolini introduced a written plan that was accepted by all as the Munich Agreement. (Many years later, it was discovered that the so-called Italian plan had been prepared at the Foreign Ministry.) This was almost identical to Godesberg`s proposal: the German army was to complete the occupation of the Sudetenland by October 10, and an international commission would decide on the future of other disputed territories. Czechoslovakia was informed by Britain and France that it could either resist Germany alone or submit to the prescribed annexations. The Czechoslovak government decided to submit. As Hitler continued to deliver inflammatory speeches demanding that the Germans of Czechoslovakia be reunited with their homeland, war seemed imminent. However, neither France nor Britain felt ready to defend Czechoslovakia, and both were anxious to avoid a military confrontation with Germany at almost any cost.
In France, the Popular Front government had come to an end, and on April 8, 1938, Édouard Daladier formed a new cabinet without socialist participation or communist support. Four days later, Le Temps, whose foreign policy was steered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, published an article by Joseph Barthelemy, a professor at the Faculty of Law in Paris, in which he examined the Franco-Czechoslovak Treaty of Alliance of 1924 and concluded that France was not obliged to go to war to save Czechoslovakia. Earlier, on March 22, the Times of London said in an editorial by its editor-in-chief G.G. Dawson that Britain could not wage war to preserve Czech sovereignty over the Sudeten Germans without first clearly identifying the wishes of the Sudeten Germans; otherwise, “Britain may well fight against the principle of self-determination.” In mid-September Chamberlain offered to go to Hitler`s retreat to Berchtesgaden to discuss the situation personally with the Führer. Hitler agreed not to take military action without further discussion, and Chamberlain agreed to try to convince his cabinet and the Frenchman to accept the results of a referendum in the Sudetenland. Daladier and his foreign minister, Georges-Étienne Bonnet, then traveled to London, where a joint proposal was being prepared that all regions with more than 50 percent Sudeten Germans should be handed over to Germany. The Czechoslovaks were not consulted. The Czechoslovak government initially rejected the proposal, but had to accept it on 21 September. Before leaving Munich, Chamberlain and Hitler signed a document declaring their common desire to settle disputes through consultations to ensure peace.
Daladier and Chamberlain returned home to greet cheering crowds, relieved that the threat of war was over, and Chamberlain told the British public that he had achieved “peace with honor.” I think it is peace for our time. His words were immediately questioned by his greatest critic Winston Churchill, who said: “You had a choice between war and shame. You have chosen shame and you will have war. In fact, Chamberlain`s policies were discredited the following year when Hitler annexed the rest of Czechoslovakia in March, and then triggered World War II by invading Poland in September. The Munich Accords became the epitome of the futility of appeasement of expansionist totalitarian states, although they gave the Allies time to increase their military readiness. 3. The conditions of evacuation shall be determined in detail by an international commission composed of representatives of Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Czechoslovakia. (2) The United Kingdom, France and Italy agree that the evacuation of the area should be completed by 10 October at the latest without destruction of the existing installations and that the Czechoslovak Government will be held responsible for carrying out the evacuation without damaging those installations.
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